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1 
I Hegel and the Subversion of the System 
Subversion of System/ Systems of Sulmersion 
Gary Shapiro 
Dear Reader: I wonder if you may not sometimes have felt in-
clined to doubt a little the correctness of the familiar philo-
sophic maxim that the external is the internal, and the internal 
the external. 
- Victor Eremita, Preface to Either/Or 
What might it mean to think outside or beyond the Hegelian system 
of philosophy? Already in Hegel's own time this was a question that came 
to occupy those who labored under the weight of his speculative and 
comprehensive system of thought. The easiest and most immediately ap-
pealing strategy was to seize upon some category that seemed to be rel-
atively neglected within the system, something that seemed to have been 
too easily aufgehoben into the totality. Kierkegaard is sometimes repre-
sented as centering his challenges to the Hegelian system around the val-
orization of the unhappy consciousness; that is, the consciousness aware 
of the immensity of the gap between itself and the infinite for which it 
longs. 1 There is a danger in choosingjust one category from the entire He-
gelian array, however, or in wanting to reverse the privileged status that 
the system accords to one of a pair of values (in Kierkegaard's case the 
reversal of the values given to the happy and unhappy consciousness). 
The danger is one that, as Derrida formulates it, is an ingredient in any 
practice that "put[s] the old names to work, or evenjust leave[s] them in 
circulation"; it is ''the risk of settling down or of regressing into the sys-
tem that has been, or is in the process of being deconstructed. To deny 
2 Writing the Politics of Difference 
this risk would be to confirm it.' '2 So Kierkegaard, who rejects the system 
so vehemently, can be and has been read as elaborating a dialectics of ex-
istence that is simply the Hegelian system inverted or reversed. The rea-
sons are not difficult to see. To the extent that the old terms bear their old 
meanings and affiliations with the other terms of the system, simply de-
nying those meanings and affiliations is to invite a return of the repressed. 
Marx himself introduced the figure of inversion or reversal for the oper-
ations he intended to perform on Hegel, although he was much more re-
spectful of the system than Kierkegaard, and most plausible reconstruc-
tions of Marxist thought still tend to be Hegelian. Sartre, in Being and 
Nothingness, aimed at a certain transformation of the Logic by radicaliz-
ing nothingness. Twenty years later, in The Critique of Dialectical Reason, 
he had come to embrace a much more explicitly Hegelian position, as ab-
stract Being had been transformed into the practico-inert and the drama 
of human freedom was no longer played out in the Phenomenology's early 
chapter on ''Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness" but 
had advanced all the way to "Absolute Freedom and Terror." These sub-
versions of the Hegelian system are not entirely unsuccessful; but they do 
raise the question of whether and to what extent a subversion more pro-
found than inversion or reversal is possible. We might note that all of 
these subversions of the system could equally well be described as sys-
tems of subversion. In this respect we could point out that Hegel's phi-
losophy is itself a system of subversion: one that sees the negative every-
where, that applies criticism universally (beyond the limits assigned to it 
in the Kantian critique), and that deploys a set of categories that will 
throw into high relief the actual and potential contradictions of whatever 
exists. More specifically, Hegel aims at a subversion of the systems of 
Fichte and Schelling. One sense of the equation of the actual and the ra-
tional is surely that the actual shares in the movements, contradictions, 
and tensions of reason and that its limits are accordingly subject to rea-
sonable articulation and critique. To the extent that a subversion of the 
Hegelian system operates in the spirit of this (left) Hegelian system of 
subversion we detect a certain modification and diversification of the He-
gelian enterprise as well as its reconfirmation. 
Perhaps Heidegger's questioning of Hegel does appropriately seek 
to establish a distance between itself and these various systems of sub-
version. As Heidegger pointed out in his "Letter on Humanism" the re-
versal of a metaphysical formula simply reconfirms metaphysics. 3 Al-
though provoked by Sartre's formula "existence precedes essence," it 
could be amplified to include his variation on being and nothingness from 
the Logic, or lord and bondsman from the Phenomenology. Heidegger's 
own questioning of Hegel proceeds not by isolating an aspect of the He-
gelian system but by interrogating the spirit of the system itself. It is not 









